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Abstract
The balanced contributions property introduced by Myerson (1980;
International Journal of Game Theory 9, 169-182) characterizes the
Shapley value as a unique e±cient and one-point solution for cooper-
ative games. By replacing the reduced game in the property with the
other types of reduced games, variations of the property are obtained.
The new balanced contributions properties characterize other e±cient
and one-point solutions for cooperative games such as the egalitarian
value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value. The characterizations lead
to non-cooperative implementations of those values. In addition, since
all of those values are linear, any convex combination of the values, such
as the ®-egalitarian Shapley value and the ®-consensus value, and a
value in a class of equal surplus sharing solutions are characterized and
implemented in the similar way.
JEL classi¯cation: C71, C72
Keywords: balanced contributions property, egalitarian value, CIS value,
ENSC value, axiomatization, implementation,
1 Introduction
One of the important criteria in collective decision-making problems is fair-
ness. In cooperative game theory, the widely used fairness criterion is the
balanced contributions property introduced by Myerson (1980). The prop-
erty asserts that \for any two players i and j, i's contribution to j should be
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equal to j's contribution to i," hence, the property is interpreted as a kind
of the fairness property among players.
Player i's contribution to j is evaluated by the di®erence between the
two values which j receives in the original game and in the reduced game
induced from i's withdrawal. In the balanced contributions property, i's
withdrawal induce the restricted game on the set of players except i. How-
ever, a restriction of the game on the set of remaining players is slightly
di®erent from the situation induced from a player's withdrawal. Consider
the situation in which people discuss how to allocate the goods that have
already been produced. If someone leaves the situation with obtaining some
goods, the remaining players discuss how to allocate the remaining goods
rather than the amount of goods remaining players can produce.
Kongo et al. (2007) consider such situations and de¯ne the marginal
games in which players being withdrawn cooperate to remaining players with
obtaining the value they can generate by themselves. By using the marginal
games, they introduce a variation of the balanced contributions property
and the new property characterizes the Shapley value. Since the original
balanced contributions property also characterizes the Shapley value, the
Shapley value is an e±cient and one-point solution characterized by the two
di®erent fairness criteria.
In this paper, by considering three other reduced games, we introduce
three variations of the balanced contributions properties. Each of the three
properties characterizes three well-known values for cooperative games: the
egalitarian value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value. Thus, all of those
values are seem to be \fair" solutions as well as the Shapley value and the
di®erences among them come from the di®erences in evaluation of player's
contribution to the other.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and de¯nitions are pre-
sented in Section 2. The variations of the balanced contributions property
and characterizations of the egalitarian value, the CIS value, and the ENSC
value are given in Section 3. The non-cooperative implementations of the
values are presented in Section 4. Further generalization are included in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
A pair (N; v) is a cooperative game (with transferable utility) where N µ N
is a ¯nite set of players and v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0 is a characteristic
function. Let jN j = n where jN j represents the cardinality of N . A subset
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S of N is called a coalition. For any S µ N , v(S) represents the worth of
the coalition. For simplicity, each singleton is represented as i instead of fig
when there exist no fear of confusion.
Let G be a set of all cooperative games. A value on G is a mapping that
assigns to each (N; v) 2 G an n-dimensional vector (xi)i2N that satis¯esP
i2N xi = v(N).
One of the well-known values on the class of cooperative games is the
Shapley value introduced by Shapley (1953). Given (N; v) 2 G, the Shapley
value Sh(N; v) = (Shi(N; v))i2N is de¯ned as follows: For each i 2 N ,
Shi(N; v) =
X
SµNni
jSj!(n¡ 1¡ jSj)!
n!
(v(S [ i)¡ v(S)) :
Other well-known values on the class of cooperative games is the egali-
tarian value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value (see Driessen and Funaki
(1991)). Given (N; v) 2 G,
² the egalitarian value EG(N; v) = (EGi(N; v))i2N is de¯ned as follows:
For each i 2 N ,
EGi(N; v) =
v(N)
n
:
² The CIS value (Center-of-gravity of the Imputation-Set value), CIS(N; v) =
(CISi(N; v))i2N is de¯ned as follows: For each i 2 N ,
CISi(N; v) =
v(N)¡Pj2N v(j)
n
+ v(i):
² The ENSC value (Egalitarian Non-Separable Contribution value), ENSC(N; v) =
(ENSCi(N; v))i2N is de¯ned as follows: For each i 2 N ,
ENSCi(N; v) =
v(N)¡Pj2N (v(N)¡ v(Nnj))
n
+ v(N)¡ v(Nni):
Let S µ N . The S-marginal game (NnS; vS) of (N; v) is the game that
assigns to each coalition T µ NnS the worth of T [ S minus the worth of
S, that is, for each T µ NnS,
vS(T ) = v(S [ T )¡ v(S):
In the S-marginal game, any non-empty subset of NnS can win the cooper-
ation of S by paying the value v(S) to S
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The S-volunteer game (NnS; v^S) is the game that assigns to each coali-
tion T µ NnS with T 6= ; the worth of T [ S and to the empty set 0, that
is, for each T µ NnS,
v^S(T ) =
(
v(S [ T ) if T 6= ;
0 if T = ;:
In the S-volunteer game, any non-empty subset of NnS can win the coop-
eration of S by paying nothing to S.
The projection S-marginal game (NnS; ¹vS) is the game that assigns to
NnS the worth of N minus the worth of S and each coalition T ( NnS the
worth of the coalition, that is, for each T µ NnS,
¹vS(T ) =
(
v(N)¡ v(S) if T = NnS
v(T ) if T 6= NnS:
In the projection S-marginal game, only the set NnS can win the coopera-
tion of S by paying v(S) to S and any proper subset of NnS cannot win any
cooperation of S. This game is equivalent to the projection reduced game of
(N; v) with respect to x 2 Rn and S µ N if Pi2S xi = v(S).
The complement S-marginal game (NnS; ~vS) is the game that assigns to
each coalition T µ NnS with T 6= ; the worth of T [ S minus S's marginal
contribution to N and to the empty set 0, that is, for each T µ NnS,
~vS(T ) =
(
v(S [ T )¡ (v(N)¡ v(NnS)) if T 6= ;
0 if T = ;:
In the complement S-marginal game, each non-empty subset of NnS can
win the cooperation of S by paying v(N) ¡ v(NnS) to S. This game is
equivalent to the complement reduced game of (N; v) with respect to x 2 Rn
and S µ N , introduced by Moulin (1985), if Pi2S xi = v(N)¡ v(NnS).
3 Balanced contributions properties
Let ' be a value for cooperative games. Myerson (1980) introduces the
following balanced contributions property.
Balanced contributions property: For each (N; v) 2 G and any i; j 2 N
with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; vjNnj) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; vjNni);
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where vjNnk : 2Nnk ! R is de¯ned as vjNnk(S) = v(S) for S µ Nnk
with k = i; j.
The above property asserts that \for any two players i and j, i's contri-
bution to j should be equal to j's contribution to i," and i's contribution to
j is evaluated by the di®erence between the two values that j receives in the
original game and in the reduced game. As we mentioned in the previous
section, there are varieties of the reduced games; hence there are variations
of the evaluations of each player's contributions to the other.
By using the marginal games, Kongo et al. (2007) present the following
variation of the balanced contributions property.
Balanced M-contributions property: For each (N; v) 2 G and any i; j 2
N with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; vj) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; vi):
In the above property, the marginal games are used instead of the restric-
tion of original games. Kongo et al. (2007) show that the above property
characterize the Shapley value.
By using the other three games introduced in the previous section, three
variations of the balanced contributions property is presented.
Balanced V-contributions property: For each (N; v) 2 G and any i; j 2
N with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; v^j) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; v^i):
Balanced PM-contributions property: For each (N; v) 2 G and any
i; j 2 N with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; ¹vj) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; ¹vi):
Balanced CM-contributions property: For each (N; v) 2 G and any
i; j 2 N with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; ~vj) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; ~vi):
We obtain the following.
Lemma 1. (i) The egalitarian value satis¯es the balanced V-contributions
property.
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(ii) The CIS value satis¯es the balanced PM-contributions property.
(iii) The ENSC value satis¯es the balanced CM-contributions property.
Proof. For each (N; v) 2 G, in the case of jN j = 1, they are obvious. Let
jN j ¸ 2 and for any i; j 2 N with i 6= j:
For (i);
EGi(N; v)¡ EGj(N; v) = 0;
and
EGi(Nnj; v^j)¡ EGj(Nni; v^i) = v^(Nnj)
n¡ 1 ¡
v^(Nni)
n¡ 1 =
v(N)
n¡ 1 ¡
v(N)
n¡ 1 = 0:
For (ii);
CISi(N; v)¡ CISj(N; v) = v(i)¡ v(j);
and
CISi(Nnj; ¹vj)¡ CISj(Nni; ¹vi)
=
¹vj(Nnj)¡Pk2Nnj ¹vj(k)
n¡ 1 + ¹v
j(i)¡
¹vi(Nni)¡Pk2Nni ¹vi(k)
n¡ 1 ¡ ¹v
i(j)
=
v(N)¡Pk2N v(k)
n¡ 1 +v(i)¡
v(N)¡Pk2N v(k)
n¡ 1 ¡v(j) = v(i)¡v(j):
For (iii);
ENSCi(N; v)¡ENSCj(N; v) = ¡v(Nni) + v(Nnj);
and
ENSCi(Nnj; ~vj)¡ ENSCj(Nni; ~vi)
=
~vj(Nnj)¡Pk2Nnj(~vj(Nnj)¡ ~vj(Nnfj; kg))
n¡ 1 + ~v
j(Nnj)¡ ~vj(Nnfj; ig)
¡
~vi(Nni)¡Pk2Nni(~vi(Nni)¡ ~vi(Nnfi; kg))
n¡ 1 ¡ ~v
i(Nni) + ~vi(Nnfi; jg)
=
v(Nnj)¡Pk2Nnj(v(Nnj)¡ v(Nnk) + v(N)¡ v(Nnj))
n¡ 1
+v(Nnj)¡ v(Nni) + v(N)¡ v(Nnj)
¡
v(Nni)¡Pk2Nni(v(Nni)¡ v(Nnk) + v(N)¡ v(Nni))
n¡ 1
¡v(Nni) + v(Nnj)¡ v(N) + v(Nni)
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=
P
k2N v(Nnk)¡ (n¡ 1)v(N)
n¡ 1 ¡ v(Nni) + v(N)
¡
P
k2N (v(Nnk)¡ (n¡ 1)v(N)
n¡ 1 + v(Nnj)¡ v(N)
= ¡v(Nni) + v(Nnj):
Moreover, each of the three properties characterizes the egalitarian value,
the CIS value and the ENSC value, respectively.
Theorem 1. (i) The egalitarian value is the unique value which satis¯es
the balanced V-contributions property.
(ii) The CIS value is the unique value which satis¯es the balanced PM-
contributions property.
(iii) The ENSC value is the unique value which satis¯es the balanced CM-
contributions property.
Proof. We show only (ii), since (i) and (iii) are shown in the similar manner.
By Lemma 1, it is su±cient to show the uniqueness of the value satisfying
the property. We use the induction with respect to the number of players.
Let ' be a value on the class of cooperative games. In the case of jN j = 1,
'i(N; v) = v(i) = CISi(N; v) for i 2 N . If jN j = 2, by the balanced
PM-contributions property,
'i(N; v)¡ 'j(N; v) = 'i(Nnj; ¹vj)¡ 'j(Nni; ¹vi) = ¡v(j) + v(i):
Together with 'i(N; v) + 'j(N; v) = v(N), the above equality implies
'i(N; v) =
v(N)¡ v(j)¡ v(i)
2
+ v(i) = CISi(N; v);
and
'j(N; v) =
v(N)¡ v(i)¡ v(j)
2
+ v(j) = CISj(N; v):
Let n ¸ 2 and suppose ' = CIS in case of there are less than n players.
Consider the case of n players. Fix i 2 N ; by the balanced PM-contributions
property and the induction hypothesis, for any j 2 Nni,
'i(N; v)¡ 'j(N; v) = 'i(Nnj; ¹vj)¡ 'j(Nni; ¹vi)
= CISi(Nnj; ¹vj)¡ CISj(Nni; ¹vi)
= CISi(N; v)¡ CISj(N; v):
7
Summing up the above equalities over j 2 Nni, we obtain
(n¡ 1)'i(N; v)¡
X
j 6=i
'j(N; v) = (n¡ 1)CISi(N; v)¡
X
j 6=i
CISj(N; v):
Together with
P
k2N 'k(N; v) = v(N) =
P
k2N CISk(N; v), the above
equality implies
n'i(N; v)¡ v(N) = nCISi(N; v)¡ v(N):
Since n ¸ 2, 'i(N; v) = CISi(N; v). For any j 6= i, 'j(N; v) = CISj(N; v)
is shown in the same manner. Hence ' = CIS in the case of there are n
players.
By the result, recursive representations of the egalitarian value, the CIS
value, and the ENSC value are obtained as follows:
Proposition 1. For each (N; v) 2 G and any i 2 N ,
(i) EGi(N; v) =
1
n
X
j 6=i
EGi(Nnj; v^j),
(ii) CISi(N; v) =
1
n
v(i) +
1
n
X
j 6=i
CISi(Nnj; ¹vj), and
(iii) ENSCi(N; v) =
1
n
(v(N)¡ v(Nni)) + 1
n
X
j 6=i
ENSCi(Nnj; ~vj);
Proof. We show only (iii), since (i) and (ii) are shown in the similar manner.
By the balanced CM-contributions property of the ENSC value, for any
i; j 2 N with i 6= j,
ENSCi(Nnj; ~vj) = ENSCi(N; v)¡ ENSCj(N; v) + ENSCj(Nni; ~vi):
Summing up the above equality over j 2 Nni and divided by n, we obtain
1
n
X
j 6=i
ENSCi(Nnj; ~vj)
=
n¡ 1
n
ENSCi(N; v)¡ 1
n
X
j 6=i
ENSCj(N; v) +
1
n
X
j 6=i
ENSCj(Nni; ~vi)
=
n¡ 1
n
ENSCi(N; v)¡ 1
n
(v(N)¡ ENSCi(N; v)) + 1
n
X
j 6=i
ENSCj(Nni; ~vi)
= ENSCi(N; v)¡ 1
n
v(N) +
1
n
~vi(Nni)
= ENSCi(N; v)¡ 1
n
v(N) +
1
n
v(Nni):
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Rearranging the above equality, we obtain the desired result.
4 Implementation
In this section, given a cooperative game, we consider three non-cooperative
games each of which implements the egalitarian value, the CIS value, and the
ENSC value of the cooperative game, respectively, as equilibrium payo®s. In
those non-cooperative games, variations of marginal games and the recursive
formulas we mentioned in the paper play important roles.
Given a cooperative game (N; v) 2 G, the non-cooperative game ¡^(N; v)
is de¯ned in the following recursive manner.
In case jN j = 1, player i 2 N obtains v(i) and the game is over.
Assume that the non-cooperative game is known when there are less
than n players. We de¯ne the case where there are n players.
t=1 Each player i 2 N makes bids bij 2 R for every player j 6= i.
For each i 2 N , the net bid Bi is the sum of the bids he made
minus the sum of the bids the others made to him, that is, Bi =P
j 6=i b
i
j ¡
P
j 6=i b
j
i : Let ¯ = argmaxiB
i, where in the case of multiple
maximizers, one of them is randomly chosen. The chosen player ¯
pays b¯j to every player j 6= ¯.
t=2 Player ¯ makes an o®er x¯j 2 R to every player j 2 Nn¯.
t=3 Players inNn¯ respond to the o®er in a sequential manner, say (j1; : : : ; jn¡1).
An order of the players makes no matter. Response is either \accept
it" or \reject it".
In case player jh accepts the o®er, the next player jh+1 responds to
it. If every jh accepts the o®er, the players come to an agreement. If
there is some rejection, an agreement is not reached.
When an agreement is reached, proposer ¯ pays the proposed payo®
xj for any j 2 Nn¯ in return for obtaining the value of their total
cooperation, v(N). Thus, the payo® for responder j is
b¯j + x
¯
j
and the payo® for proposer ¯ is
v(N)¡
X
j 6=¯
b¯j ¡
X
j 6=¯
x¯j :
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Then the game is over.
On the other hand, when an agreement is not reached, the proposer
leaves the game with obtaining nothing and the remaining playersNn¯
continue the non-cooperative game ¡^(Nn¯; v^¯).
Non-cooperative games ¹¡(N; v) and ~¡(N; v) are de¯ned almost the same
as the game ¡^(N; v). The di®erence among them is that, when an agree-
ment is not reached at t=3, in ¹¡(N; v), the proposer ¯ leaves the game
with obtaining v(¯) and remaining players continue the non-cooperative
game ¹¡(Nn¯; ¹v¯), and in ~¡(N; v), the proposer ¯ leaves the game with ob-
taining v(N)¡ v(Nn¯) and remaining players continue the non-cooperative
game ~¡(Nn¯; ~v¯). These non-cooperative games are variations of a non-
cooperative game ¡(N; v) in Kongo et al. (2007) and are inspired by bidding
mechanisms presented in P¶erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
Kongo et al. (2007) show that ¡(N; v) implements the Shapley value for
any (N; v) 2 G. Similarly, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. For any (N; v) 2 G,
(i) ¡^(N; v) produces the egalitarian value payo® in any subgame perfect
equilibrium (henceforth, SPE),
(ii) ¹¡(N; v) produces the CIS value payo® in any SPE, and
(iii) ~¡(N; v) produces the ENSC value payo® in any SPE.
Proof. We prove only (i), since (ii) and (iii) are shown in the similar way.
The proof proceeds by induction with respect to the number of players.
If jN j = 1, the egalitarian value is equal to the value of stand-alone coalition;
hence, the theorem holds. Assume that the theorem holds in case there are
less than n players and consider the case when there are n players.
First, we show that there exists an SPE whose payo® coincides with the
egalitarian value of the game (N; v). Consider the following strategy for
each player.
t=1 Each player i 2 N announces bij = EGj(N; v)¡EGj(Nni; v^i) for every
j 6= i.
t=2 A proposer ¯ o®ers x¯j = EGj(Nn¯; v^¯) for every j 2 Nn¯.
t=3 A responder j accepts the o®er if x¯j = EGj(Nn¯; v^¯) and rejects it
otherwise.
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If all players take the above strategies, an agreement is formed at t=3
and the game is over. It is clear that the above strategy pro¯le yields
the egalitarian value for any player who is not the proposer ¯ since b¯j +
x¯j = EGj(N; v) for any j 6= ¯. The proposer ¯ obtains v(N)¡
P
j 6=¯ b
¯
j ¡P
j 6=¯ x
¯
j = v(N) ¡
P
j 6=¯ EGj(N; v) = EG¯(N; v). Note that each player
obtains his egalitarian value whether or not the player is a proposer. In
other words, given the strategies, an outcome is the same regardless of who
is chosen as a proposer.
To check whether the above strategies constitute an SPE, ¯rst, we show
that the strategies at t=3 are best responses for each of the players. Let
jn¡1 be the last player who has to decide whether accept or reject the o®er.
If no other players reject an o®er, player jn¡1's best response is accept the
o®er if x¯jn¡1 = EGjn¡1(Nn¯; v^¯) and reject it otherwise. Knowing that the
above mentioned reaction of the last player, the second last player jn¡2's
best response is accept the o®er if x¯jn¡2 = EGjn¡2(Nn¯; v^¯) and reject it
otherwise. Using the same argument to go backward, we can show that the
strategies mentioned above constitute an SPE of the subgame starting from
t=3.
Next, we prove that the strategies at t=2 are best responses for each of
them. By the strategies, the proposer ¯ obtains v(N)¡Pj 6=¯ EGj(Nn¯; v^¯) =
0 in the subgame starting from t=2. If he o®ers some player j the value ¹x¯j
less than EGj(Nn¯; v^¯), the o®er is rejected by the player and the proposer
obtains 0 which is not strictly better o®. If he o®ers some player j the
value x^¯j larger than EGj(Nn¯; v^¯) without lowering the o®er to the other
players, the o®er is accepted but the share of the proposer is strictly worse
o®. Thus, the above mentioned strategies constitute a SPE of the subgame
starting from t=2.
Then, we show that the strategies t=1 are best responses for each of
them. Given the strategies, for any i 2 N ,
Bi =
X
j 6=i
bij ¡
X
j 6=i
bji
=
X
j 6=i
(EGj(N; v)¡EGj(Nni; v^i))¡
X
j 6=i
(EGi(N; v)¡EGi(Nnj; v^j)) = 0;
since EG satis¯es the balanced V-contributions property. Hence, all players
are chosen to be a proposer with probability 1n . As seen before, the outcome
is the same regardless of who is chosen as a proposer. Given the above
mentioned strategies, consider the case that player i changes his strategy to
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¹bij = b
i
j + aj for each of j 6= i. If
P
j 6=i aj < 0, i is not chosen as a proposer;
hence, his ¯nal payo® is unchanged. If
P
j 6=i aj = 0, i may be chosen to be
a proposer. In the case that he is not chosen as a proposer, his ¯nal payo®
is unchanged. In the case that he is chosen as a proposer, his ¯nal payo® is
v(N)¡
X
j 6=i
¹bij¡
X
j 6=i
EGj(Nni; v^i) = v(N)¡
X
j 6=i
bij¡
X
j 6=i
EGj(Nni; v^i) = EGi(N; v);
which means his ¯nal payo® is unchanged. If
P
j 6=i aj > 0, i must be chosen
to be a proposer. However, by the previous result, he obtains
v(N)¡
X
j 6=i
¹bij¡
X
j 6=i
EGj(Nni; v^i) < v(N)¡
X
j 6=i
bij¡
X
j 6=i
EGj(Nni; v^i) = EGi(N; v):
Thus, his share is strictly worse o®. Therefore, the above mentioned strate-
gies constitute a SPE.
Next, we prove that any SPE implements the egalitarian value payo® as
an equilibrium outcome by the following series of claims.
Claim 1: In any subgame starting from t=2, a proposer ¯ obtains 0 and
each of the other players obtains his egalitarian value of the game
(Nn¯; v^¯) in any SPE.
Let ¯ be a proposer. There are two types of SPEs: (a) SPEs in which
someone rejects the o®er at t=3 and (b) SPEs in which players reach an
agreement at t=3.
In case (a), by the de¯nition of the non-cooperative game ¡^(N; v) and
the induction hypothesis, ¯ obtains 0 and each of the other players obtains
his egalitarian value of the game (Nn¯; v^¯).
By the induction hypothesis, each player j 6= ¯ surely obtains EGj(Nn¯; v^¯)
by rejecting the o®er. Hence, in case (b), each player j 6= ¯ obtains not
less than EGj(Nn¯; v^¯). Thus, the proposer ¯ obtains at most 0 since
v(N) ¡Pj 6=¯ EGj(Nn¯; v^¯) = 0. But, the proposer ¯ surely obtains 0
when the o®er is rejected. Hence, he must obtain 0 in case (b). Therefore,
the claim also holds in this case.
Claim 2: In any SPE, Bi =
P
j 6=i b
i
j ¡
P
j 6=i b
j
i = 0 for any i 2 N .
Claim 3: In any SPE, each player's payo® is the same regardless of who is
chosen as a proposer.
The above two claims are the same as Claim (c) and (d) of P¶erez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001), and are shown in the same manner, respectively.
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Claim 4: In any SPE, the ¯nal payo® coincides with the egalitarian value.
Let uji be i's equilibrium payo® when j is the proposer at t=1. By Claim
1,
uii = ¡
X
k 6=i
bik
and for each j 6= i,
uji = b
j
i + EGi(Nnj; v^j):
Thus, X
j2N
uji = ¡
X
k 6=i
bik +
X
j 6=i
bji +
X
j 6=i
EGi(Nnj; v^j):
By Claim 2, the above equality is equivalent toX
j2N
uji =
X
j 6=i
EGi(Nnj; v^j):
By Claim 3,
P
j2N u
j
i = nu
k
i for each k 2 N . Therefore, for each k 2 N ,
uki =
1
n
X
j 6=i
EGi(Nnj; v^j):
By Proposition 1, the right-hand side of the above equality coincides with
EGi(N; v).
The following table summarizes our results and those of Kongo et al.
(2007).
Table 1: A summary of implementations
Games ¡ ¡^ ¹¡ ~¡
rejection at t=3,
proposer ¯ obtains v(¯) 0 v(¯) v(N)¡ v(Nn¯)
others play (Nn¯; v¯) (Nn¯; v^¯) (Nn¯; ¹v¯) (Nn¯; ~v¯)
implements Sh EG CIS ENSC
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5 Concluding remarks
To conclude the paper, we discuss generalizations of our results.
A value ' is linear if for any ¸; ¸0 2 R and any (N; v); (N; v0) 2 G,
'(N;¸v + ¸0v0) = ¸'(N; v) + ¸0'(N; v0);
where (N;¸v + ¸0v0) 2 G is de¯ned as (¸v + ¸0v0)(S) = ¸v(S) + ¸0v0(S) for
any S µ N . Since all of the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the CIS
value, and the ENSC value are linear, any convex combination of them is
characterized and implemented in the same manner as we did in this paper.
Convex combinations of those values are studied in Joosten (1996),
van den Brink and Funaki (2004), and Ju et al. (2007). Joosten (1996)
introduced the ®-egalitarian Shapley value that is a convex combination
of the egalitarian value and the Shapley value, van den Brink and Funaki
(2004) studied convex combinations of the egalitarian value, the CIS value,
and the ENSC value, and Ju et al. (2007) introduced the ®-consensus value
that is a convex combination of the CIS value and the Shapley value. Here,
we mention only the ®-egalitarian Shapley value in detail, but the follow-
ing discussions are applicable to the other convex combinations of the four
values.
Let ® 2 [0; 1]. The ®-egalitarian Shapley value Á® of the game (N; v) is
Á®(N; v) = ®EG(N; v) + (1¡ ®)Sh(N; v):
For any ® 2 [0; 1], the reduced games for a characterization of the ®-
egalitarian Shapley value are convex combinations of the volunteer games
and the marginal games. Given (N; v) 2 G, ® 2 [0; 1], and S µ N , the game
(NnS; vS;®) is de¯ned as, for each T µ NnS,
vS;®(T ) = ®v^S(T ) + (1¡ ®)vS(T ) =
(
v(S [ T )¡ (1¡ ®)v(S) if T 6= ;
0 if T = ;:
In the above game, any non-empty subset of NnS can win the coopera-
tion of S by paying the value (1¡ ®)v(S) to S. The ®-egalitarian Shapley
value is characterized by the following property:
For each (N; v) 2 G, each ® 2 [0; 1] and any i; j 2 N with i 6= j,
'i(N; v)¡ 'i(Nnj; vj;®) = 'j(N; v)¡ 'j(Nni; vi;®):
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For an implementation, we construct the non-cooperative game ¡®(N; v)
in which almost the same as the game ¡^(N; v). The di®erence between
the two is that, when an agreement is not reached at t=3, the proposer
¯ leaves the game with obtaining 0 and remaining players continue the
non-cooperative game ¡®(Nn¯; v^¯) with probability ®, and the proposer ¯
leaves the game with obtaining v(¯) and remaining players continue the
non-cooperative game ¡®(Nn¯; v¯) with probability 1¡ ®.
Acknowledgment: The author thanks Yukihiko Funaki for helpful discus-
sions and comments.
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